Indiana Law Journal
Volume 89

Issue 1

Article 9

Winter 2014

Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias
Eyal Zamir Prof.
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, eyal.zamir@mail.huji.ac.il

Ilana Ritov
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ilana.ritov@huji.ac.il

Doron Teichman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, doron.teichman@mail.huji.ac.il

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Zamir, Eyal Prof.; Ritov, Ilana; and Teichman, Doron (2014) "Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 89 : Iss. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol89/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias
∗

EYAL ZAMIR, ILANA RITOV, AND DORON TEICHMAN

A large body of studies suggests that people are reluctant to impose liability on
the basis of circumstantial evidence alone, even when this evidence is more reliable
than direct evidence. Current explanations for this pattern of behavior focus on
factors such as the tendency of fact finders to assign low subjective probabilities to
circumstantial evidence, the statistical nature of such evidence, and the fact that
direct evidence can rule out with greater ease any competing factual theory
regarding liability.
This Article describes a set of four new experiments demonstrating that even
when these factors are controlled for, the disinclination to impose liability based on
indirect evidence remains. While these findings do not necessarily refute the
existing theories, they indicate that these theories are incomplete and point to the
existence of a deep-seated bias against basing liability on inferences—an antiinference bias. The Article discusses the potential policy implications of the new
findings for procedural and substantive legal norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Sherlock Holmes, Hercules Poirot, Sir Henry Merrivale, and even Dr. Gregory
House have long been admired for their ability to solve mysteries using logic,
deductive reasoning, and inferences from circumstantial evidence. However, the
creators of detective stories and TV dramas almost never rely solely on this type of
evidence. The detective story or TV episode will typically include a climactic scene
in which direct evidence, such as a confession by the culprit, is presented. This
serves to reassure the readers and viewers that the inferential arguments were
indeed correct. The implicit assumption seems to be that inferences are insufficient
to determine the culpability of the suspect (an assumption which is reinforced by
the technique of incorporating misleading circumstantial evidence into detective
stories and TV dramas).
The same is plausibly true in the courtroom. There are grounds to believe that
judicial fact finders treat direct and circumstantial evidence differently and are
more reluctant to impose liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone.1 In
exhibiting this reluctance, fact finders sometimes follow legal norms that caution
against relying on circumstantial evidence, but more often disregard legal norms
that deny the relevance of this distinction.2 Scholars largely agree that this tendency
is indefensible.3 In fact, it is sometimes noted that circumstantial evidence is more
reliable than direct evidence, and thus discounting its probative value is a
“paradox.”4
Several explanations have been offered for the tendency not to impose liability
solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Most of these explanations,
however, are incomplete at best.5 They are incomplete because too often they

1. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105
MICH. L. REV. 241, 247–55 (2006).
2. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1802–04 (2009) (surveying American federal and state case law); infra
Part II.
3. See 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 961 (Peter
Tillers rev. ed., 1983) (“Wigmore’s view that circumstantial evidence may be as persuasive
and as compelling as testimonial evidence, and sometimes more so, is now generally
accepted.”); Greenstein, supra note 2, at 1804 (stating that “common beliefs about the
significance of the distinction [between direct and circumstantial evidence] are false”).
4. Heller, supra note 1, at 244; see also Greenstein, supra note 2, at 1803 (pointing to
the incompatibility between instructions that caution against relying on circumstantial
evidence and the empirical data “indicating that at least some types of circumstantial
evidence are actually more reliable than familiar categories of direct evidence” (emphasis in
original)).
5. For a complete review, see infra Part II.
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conflate the direct versus circumstantial evidence distinction with related ones,
such as between eyewitness testimonies and scientific data, between concrete and
statistical proof, and between probabilistic and conclusive evidence. Once we
recognize that circumstantial evidence may be either eyewitness or forensic,
concrete or statistical, probabilistic or conclusive, and so forth, we can appreciate
the limitations of theories that rest on these distinctions.
This Article describes a series of new experiments demonstrating that even
when we have controlled for such factors as the eyewitness/forensic,
concrete/statistical, and probabilistic/conclusive character of the evidence, the
disinclination to impose liability based on non-direct evidence remains. While our
findings do not necessarily refute the existing theories, they indicate that these
theories are insufficient and point to the existence of a deep-seated bias against
basing liability on inferences from circumstantial evidence—an anti-inference bias.
The existence of an anti-inference bias gives rise to numerous complex
normative questions that have not been fully addressed by the legal literature. On
one hand, like other biases and heuristics, the anti-inference heuristic very often
yields accurate decisions and might be a reasonable rule of thumb for people to
follow in making their daily choices (that normally do not involve a courtroom).
This suggests that debiasing judicial fact finders might require them to reach
outcomes that are not aligned with the intuitions of most people regarding the
desirable outcome of trial—a possibility that raises both practical and normative
concerns. On the other hand, the anti-inference bias might give rise to systematic
errors, especially in the context of judicial fact finding. This possibility highlights
the need to design new and sophisticated tools that will help debias fact finders in
order to improve the quality of their choices. Alternatively, to the extent the bias
generates a hurdle to assigning legal responsibility in situations that require fact
finders to draw inferences, policy makers can overcome it by introducing legal
presumptions and by broadening the scope of legal liability. For example, in the
context of the law of criminal attempts, legislators could deal with the reluctance of
fact finders to deduce liability in cases of incomplete attempts (i.e., cases involving
the preparation-attempt boundary) by criminalizing preparatory acts. Once such
acts are criminalized, fact finders are no longer asked to infer whether an attempt at
a greater crime took place, and the anti-inference bias no longer plays a role.
The Article is structured as follows. Following this brief introduction, Part I
defines circumstantial evidence and surveys the extant explanations for the
persistent reluctance to base criminal and civil liability on such evidence. Part II
presents four new experiments designed to inquire whether this reluctance is unique
to statistical, probabilistic, inconclusive, forensic, or non-case-specific evidence.
Finally, Part III analyzes the contribution of our results to better understanding the
behavior of fact finders, and discusses the potential normative implications of our
findings.
I. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Direct evidence, if accepted, proves a material fact without the mediation of a
deductive process. Circumstantial evidence, in contrast, even if accepted, requires
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an additional mental step of inference in order to determine whether the material
fact did or did not exist.6 The very existence of this distinction is, however,
contested analytically. Some commentators argue that any determination of facts by
judges or juries—including determination based on eyewitness testimony—
inevitably involves inferences.7 For example, from the fact that the witness testifies
that she saw the accused stabbing the victim, and the fact finder’s impression that
the witness is telling the truth, the fact finder infers that the accused actually
stabbed the victim. According to this account, direct evidence is a myth.8 Direct
evidence may thus be described as requiring a single inference (from the evidence
to the material fact), while circumstantial evidence requires at least two: from the
evidence to an underlying fact and from the underlying fact to the material one.
Under any of these descriptions, elements of what is conventionally viewed as
direct evidence are sometimes circumstantial. For instance, when a litigant takes
the stand and testifies that she made an oral agreement with the defendant on a
certain date, her testimony would ordinarily be viewed as direct evidence.
However, typically much of this testimony will refer to the prior relationships
between the parties and their subsequent behavior in order to corroborate the
litigant’s assertion that the alleged agreement was actually made. These parts of her
testimony are analytically circumstantial evidence.9 One may thus distinguish
between evidence that is perceived as wholly circumstantial and evidence that is
not. In addition, to some extent the distinction between the two types of evidence is
a matter of degree: Some evidence requires more inferential steps than other
evidence to draw a conclusion about the material fact. Often, judicial fact finding
consists of several (possibly multistage) inferences, some independent and some
interconnected, based on a multiplicity of evidence.10
These complexities notwithstanding, the distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence is entrenched in popular and legal vocabulary. However
analytically described or critiqued, this distinction has bearing on one’s perceptions
and decisions. Inasmuch as people treat circumstantial evidence differently than
direct evidence, this differentiation may have considerable ramifications in both

6. 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 308 (Kenneth S. Broun et al.
eds., 6th, one-vol. ed. 2006); ALBERT J. MOORE, PAUL BERGMAN & DAVID A. BINDER, TRIAL
ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS, AND TECHNIQUES 2–3 (1996); PETER MURPHY,
MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 20–21 (10th ed. 2008).
7. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 952–56.
8. See Greenstein, supra note 2. This position echoes the reductionist view in the
philosophical debate over the epistemological problems of testimony. According to this
view, a testimony is not an autonomous source of epistemic authority; rather, its reliability
rests on additional sources of knowledge. See generally C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1992); Jonathan Adler, Epistemological Problems of Testimony,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony
-episprob.
9. MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–4; Paul Bergman, A Bunch of Circumstantial
Evidence, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 985, 988–89 (1996).
10. DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
passim (1987) (using symbols and diagrams to describe complex inferential processes).
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criminal and civil litigation, as often there is no direct evidence bearing on the
disputed facts.
As a doctrinal matter, some legal systems instruct, or used to instruct, fact
finders to avoid convictions based exclusively on circumstantial evidence.11 Other
legal systems have allowed fact finders to rely on such evidence, yet have required
them to exercise special caution in both criminal and civil cases.12 At times, stricter
limitations have been imposed on drawing an inference upon an inference—
namely, inferring the existence or nonexistence of a material fact from another fact
that was itself inferred from other evidence. According to one version of this
limitation, even in civil litigation, an inference upon an inference is impermissible,
and according to another version it is only permitted if the first inference meets the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.13
Clearly, the modern trend is to abandon rules limiting the use of circumstantial
evidence, including an inference upon an inference.14 Instead, fact finders are
instructed to determine the reliability and weight of any evidence, direct or indirect,
without prejudice against the latter.15 Vestiges of the distrust of circumstantial
evidence can nevertheless be found in jury instructions in some jurisdictions. Thus,
for instance, the Mississippi Model Jury Instructions provide as follows:
The court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial
evidence to establish its theory of guilt of the defendant, then the
evidence for the State must be so strong as to establish the guilt of the
defendant, not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but the evidence must

11. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is
Based Only on Conjecture”—Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1376–90 (1995) (discussing Jewish law).
12. See, e.g., id. at 1390–402 (analyzing 19th century and current American law).
13. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 68−73 (1977) (discussing
the difficulty in relying on inference upon inference); RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE,
PROOF AND PROBABILITY 35, 39–40, 237–40 (2d ed. 1983); WIGMORE, supra note 3, at
1106–19 (critically surveying the case law); Michael Foster, A Review and Reconsideration
of Florida’s Rule Against Basing an Inference on an Inference in Civil Cases, 23 STETSON L.
REV. 743 (1994) (critically discussing the rule as applied in Florida).
14. See, e.g., EGGLESTON, supra note 13, at 35, 39–40, 237–40 (rejecting Cohen’s
account of the law). On the roots of this trend in early modern English law, see BARBARA J.
SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 200–43 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (stating that, in terms
of reliability, “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial
evidence”); SIDNEY L. PHIPSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 5 (Hodge M. Malek et al. eds.,
Thomson Reuters 17th ed. 2010) (1892) (“Little is to be gained from a comparison of [direct
and indirect evidence’s] weight, since . . . both forms admit of every degree of cogency from
the lowest to the highest.”); WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 957–64, 1120–38 (surveying cases in
which judges have repudiated the rule against basing an inference on an inference);
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1400–02 (showing that most courts in the United
States follow the Holland dictum).
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be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than
that of guilt.16
Similar instructions may be found in case law.17 In the same vein, while the rule
restricting an inference upon an inference has largely been abandoned, it is still in
force in some jurisdictions.18
Commentators generally agree that the prejudice against circumstantial evidence
is unwarranted.19 Yet, empirical and experimental studies have long demonstrated
that fact finders are far more inclined to base their conclusions on direct evidence.20
Fact finders sometimes tend to undervalue the reliability and probative value of
circumstantial evidence, including statistical and forensic evidence,21 and to
overvalue the trustworthiness and weight of direct evidence, such as eyewitness
testimonies.22

16. MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 1:18 (Miss. Judicial Coll. 2012).
See also Carl N. Hammarskjold, Smokes, Candy, and the Bloody Sword: How Classifying
Jailhouse Snitch Testimony as Direct, Rather than Circumstantial, Evidence Contributes to
Wrongful Convictions, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1103, 1120–22 (2011) (describing the Mississippi
instructions in a historical context).
17. See, e.g., Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1399 (describing state courts that
refused to follow the Holland ruling); see also PHIPSON, supra note 15, at 414 (citing
approvingly the Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction that calls for examining
circumstantial evidence with care).
18. See, e.g., Stanley v. Marceaux, 991 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1960) (discussing the rules governing the
use of circumstantial evidence in civil cases); Foster, supra note 13 (critically analyzing the law
in Florida).
19. See, e.g., PHIPSON, supra note 15, at 5; WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 957–64; Greenstein,
supra note 2, at 1804 (questioning the very distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence). But see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1402–22 (criticizing the equation
of the probative weight of circumstantial and direct evidence).
20. See Heller, supra note 1, at 250–52 (contending that “jurors consistently underestimate
the probative value of [circumstantial forensic evidence]”).
21. Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 375 (1992) (describing experimental findings indicating that “where
the probabilistic evidence is most incriminating and most probative, jurors may tend to
underuse or undervalue the evidence”); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding
of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with
a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 407–18 (2005)
(reporting the results of a large-scale empirical study indicating that jurors tend to undervalue
forensic match evidence).
22. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 1, at 247–50, 253–54 (surveying the psychological
literature and the data on false convictions); R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Carolyn M.
Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?,
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 80–86 (1981) (reporting experimental results demonstrating that
subjects who viewed the cross-examination of eyewitnesses were unable to distinguish between
accurate and false identifications); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and
Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 817
(1995) (“Jurors overbelieve eyewitnesses, have difficulty reliably differentiating accurate from
inaccurate eyewitnesses, and are not adequately sensitive to aspects of witnessing and
identification conditions.”).
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Several explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. One is that, unlike
direct evidence, inferences are based on generalizations, “which by definition are
accurate less than 100% of the time.”23 Even reliable circumstantial evidence may
be compatible with numerous competing inferences; hence, it is necessarily
“polyvocal,” to use the term coined by Kevin Heller.24 Unlike the first explanation,
the second does not assume that circumstantial evidence is objectively less
conclusive than direct evidence, yet it argues that circumstantial evidence may be
subjectively perceived as such. Focusing on people’s reluctance to use statistical
evidence as a basis for imposing liability, it has been argued that fact finders make
decisions on the basis of subjective probability estimates, which may differ from
the objective probability estimates.25 Fact finders may believe that the reliability
and probative weight of circumstantial evidence is considerably lower than it
actually is, and therefore be reluctant to rely on it (the opposite would hold for
direct evidence).
A third explanation focuses on the typical features of eyewitness testimonies,
often atypical of circumstantial evidence. Among other things, eyewitness
testimonies provide “a verbal representation of the crime itself,” whereas indirect
evidence is often abstract.26 Direct evidence is a story-like narrative, while
arguments based on circumstantial evidence often resemble deductive reasoning.27
The former are often vivid, concrete, and stirring, while the latter are pallid,
general, and unexciting.28 These characteristics make it easier for fact finders to
form a coherent story of the events from direct evidence and, as a result, more
likely to convict.29
A fourth explanation, resonating with both the alleged generalization-based
nature of circumstantial evidence (underlying the first explanation) and its
nonconcrete quality (part of the third explanation), has to do with the casespecificity of the evidence. A central justification for the reluctance to accept a
claim on the basis of naked statistical evidence draws on the distinction between
the probability that a certain fact is true and the weight or resiliency of the evidence
supporting the claim. Decision makers may sensibly reject a claim even if the
probability that the plaintiff’s version is correct meets the controlling standard of
proof, if assessment of this probability rests on too little information or on general,

23. Bergman, supra note 9, at 988.
24. Heller, supra note 1, at 267–68; see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, at 4–7
(arguing that “circumstantial evidence frequently gives rise to multiple and even conflicting
inferences”).
25. See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy,
11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 172–81 (1987) (experimentally demonstrating subjects’ errors
in using probabilistic information); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1344–50 (1971).
26. Heller, supra note 1, at 265.
27. Id. at 265–66.
28. Id. at 267–80.
29. Cf. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, Trawling Genetic Databases: When a DNA
Match Is Just a Naked Statistic, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 49, 58–59 (2011) (discussing
the “story model of juror decision making”).
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non-case-specific evidence.30 For example, the fact that there were 1000 spectators
in a rodeo but only 400 tickets had been sold means that for any spectator chosen at
random, there is a 60% probability of her being a gatecrasher. The fact finder may
nevertheless dismiss a claim based on this evidence alone as resting on too thin an
evidentiary basis.31
Yet another possibility is that from the perspective of the fact finders, decisions
based on direct testimonies involve a smaller degree of responsibility. If it turns out
that a testimony was inaccurate or deceptive, the fact finder can rationalize that the
witness is to blame for the erroneous verdict. In contrast, if it transpires that
liability was erroneously imposed due to a faulty inference from circumstantial
evidence, the responsibility arguably lies with the fact finder.32 To avoid a feeling
of regret, a fact finder would likely be disinclined to rely on circumstantial
evidence.33 This explanation bears some similarity to the epistemological notion
that when a speaker makes testimonial assertions, she undertakes responsibility for
the accuracy of what she says; and when a hearer takes a speaker’s word for
something, she ascribes her authority.34
The sixth and seventh theories were originally offered in the context of naked
statistical evidence and later extended by Kevin Heller to circumstantial evidence
more generally.35 In a seminal study, Gary Wells conjectured that “in order for
evidence to have a significant impact on people’s verdict preferences, one’s
hypothetical belief about the ultimate fact must affect one’s belief about the
evidence.”36 For example, the mere fact that 80% of the buses in a certain town

30. For detailed discussions of this claim, primarily in the context of naked statistical
evidence, see COHEN, supra note 13, at 36–39; ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW
40–56, 80–106 (2005); L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof,
66 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1986); D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the
Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1987); Amit Pundik, What Is Wrong with
Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish an Epistemic Deficiency, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 461,
474–87 (2008) (criticizing the weight argument).
31. COHEN, supra note 13, at 74–76 (discussing the gatecrasher paradox); L. Jonathan
Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627,
627 (replying to reactions to his original analysis).
32. Heller, supra note 1, at 287.
33. For the claim that anticipation of possible ex post regret affects people’s decisions ex
ante, see generally David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30
OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982); Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in
Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 87 (1995); Graham Loomes, Further Evidence of the Impact of Regret and
Disappointment in Choice Under Uncertainty, 55 ECONOMICA 47 (1988); Graham Loomes &
Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty,
92 ECON. J. 805, 809 (1982).
34. Adler, supra note 8 (surveying the philosophical literature); see also Arnon Keren,
Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge, 4 EPISTEME 368, 368
(2007) (arguing that “to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted
proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for
believing the proposition”).
35. Heller, supra note 1.
36. Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 746 (1992) (quote italicized in original).
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belong to the blue bus company and 20% to the grey bus company is insufficient to
find the former liable for an accident caused by an unidentified bus, because the
determination of liability would not change one’s belief about the accuracy of the
statistical fact. The statistical data remains true whether or not a blue bus was
involved in the accident. In contrast, when a weigh station attendant testifies that
according to his records, a blue bus was weighed in the nearby station just before
the accident—thus tying that bus company to the accident—the determination of
liability would more likely bear on the reliability of this testimony, even if the
defendant had already established that the records were wrong 20% of the time. In
this case, determining which bus was involved in the accident does bear on the
accuracy of the weigh station’s records and the reliability of the attendant’s
testimony.
The seventh and last explanation is inspired by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky’s simulation heuristic. Kahneman and Tversky argued that the ease with
which different scenarios can be simulated is used to judge the probability of
specific events, to assess the causal connection between two events, and so forth. 37
In the present context, Keith Niedermeier and his coauthors argued that the
willingness to ground liability on statistical evidence depends on how easily one
can imagine an alternative scenario that would be compatible with the evidence.38
Arguably, it is easier to imagine such a scenario when the only evidence is
circumstantial, since by its very nature, such evidence does not prove the material

37. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 201–03 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
38. Keith E. Niedermeier, Norbert L. Kerr & Lawrence A. Messé, Jurors’ Use of Naked
Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 533, 536–37 (1999); Scurich & John, supra note 29, at 58
(discussing Niedermeier and his coauthors’ theory). Following the experimental design of
Wells, supra note 36, Niedermeier and his coauthors presented the participants in their study
with various vignettes describing a legal suit for damages. The lawsuit was filed by a woman
whose dog was killed by a bus. In all the vignettes, there was an objective probability of
80% that the defendant—one of the only two bus companies in the county—was responsible
for the accident. In the “complete match” version, the evidence was based on a comparison
between the tracks left by the bus that ran over the dog and the tracks of all the buses
belonging to the two companies. Each company operated ten buses, and the track prints
matched eight of the defendant’s buses and two buses belonging to the other company. In the
“partial match” version, there was a partial match with only one of the defendant’s buses and
one of the other company’s buses, indicating that there was an 80% probability that the
defendant’s bus was the one that ran over the dog and a 20% chance that it was a bus
belonging to the other company. The responders were asked to indicate whether they would
accept the claim against the defendant—the blue bus company—and to assess the probability
that the defendant’s bus was involved in the accident. While the assessed probability was
similar under the two conditions, the willingness to accept the claim was much lower in the
complete-match condition, arguably because in that case it was easier to imagine that the dog
had been killed by one of the other company’s two buses whose tracks matched those left by
the bus that had run over the dog. Id.; cf. Heller, supra note 1, at 258–303 (extending the
ease-of-simulation explanation and applying it to circumstantial evidence generally).
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fact itself.39 Hence, fact finders are considerably less willing to find defendants
liable on the basis of such evidence. This explanation is associated with the third
explanation discussed above, as direct evidence helps the fact finder to form a
coherent story of the events, which then makes it harder to imagine an alternative
story. In the same vein, Deanna Sykes and Joel Johnson argued that since
comprehension of a witness’s assertion entails an initial belief in that assertion,
undoing the mental representation created by the testimony and imagining an
alternative scenario requires cognitive effort.40 Such an effort is not required when
decision makers are presented with probabilistic evidence that does not include a
concrete assertion that needs to be undone.41
All of these explanations can be—and have been—challenged. Thus, for
example, the generality of the subjective probability argument (the second
explanation) was called into question by Wells, who instead offered the fact-toevidence theory.42 Wells’s theory was in turn challenged by Niedermeier, Kerr, and
Messé and Sykes and Johnson, who proposed the ease-of-simulation explanation.43
The ease-of-simulation explanation was subsequently called into question by Arkes
et al.44 As the experiments in the next Part demonstrate, none of these arguments
captures the full scope of the bias against indirect evidence.
II. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
To test the scope of fact finders’ aversion towards circumstantial evidence, we
conducted a series of four experimental surveys using situational vignettes on a
student population. In three of the four studies we employed a between-subject
design. That is, participants were randomly assigned to one of several equally sized
groups and given a questionnaire structured around a hypothetical case. Whereas
half of them read a case in which the evidence described was direct in nature, the
other half read a similar case in which the evidence was indirect. Participants were
then asked a series of questions focusing on their willingness to assign legal
liability based on the described evidence. In order to broaden the methodological
robustness of our studies, in one of them we employed a within- (rather than
between-) subject design. According to this framework all participants were
presented with both types of evidence and were asked to choose between them.

39. Cf. Heller, supra note 1, at 258–66 (describing the different applications of the easeof-simulation model to direct and circumstantial evidence).
40. Deanna L. Sykes & Joel T. Johnson, Probabilistic Evidence Versus the
Representation of an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs. Prob’s Dog, 21 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 199 (1999).
41. Id. at 209–10.
42. Wells, supra note 36, at 742, 746.
43. Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 534, 536–37; Sykes & Johnson, supra note 40,
at 200–01.
44. Hal R. Arkes, Brittany Shoots-Reinhard & Ryan S. Mayes, Disjunction Between
Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 276,
277–78 (2012).
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A. Experiment 1 (“Highway”): Conviction Based on Technological Evidence
Since much of the existing literature on circumstantial evidence focuses on criminal
liability, Experiment 1 was designed to examine how the type of evidence impacts the
willingness to impose such liability—namely, convicting a driver of a traffic violation.
Specifically, the experiment examined the difference between evidence that directly
establishes the defendant’s fault and evidence that establishes fault indirectly, requiring
an additional inferential step. The experiment held constant the nature of the evidence
involved—both scenarios alluded to technological evidence. Furthermore, it controlled
for the objective reliability of the evidence by supplying subjects with information
regarding the error rates of the enforcement technology.
We used a between-subject design, assigning each participant randomly to one of
two versions of a short scenario. The direct-evidence condition read as follows:
Speed cameras were installed on a toll road. The probability of an error in
the camera system is 2%. The speed limit on this road is 100 KPH.
According to the camera, a driver drove his car at a speed of 125 KPH late
at night.
The inference condition was as follows:
Cameras that document the exact time at which each vehicle passes by
them were installed on a toll road. The cameras do not document the speed
of the passing vehicle, but from the distance between the cameras and the
time that elapses between the points they document, it is possible to infer
the driver’s speed in that section of the road. The probability of an error in
the camera system is 2%. The speed limit on this road is 100 KPH.
According to the time elapsed and the distance between the two cameras,
a driver drove his car at a speed of 125 KPH late at night.
Note that while the enforcement technology in the two conditions differed, the text
describing the objective probability of error was identical irrespective of how many
cameras were employed (i.e., “[t]he probability of an error in the camera system is
2%”).
After reading the scenario, responders were reminded that the standard of proof in
such cases is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based on this evidentiary threshold they
were then asked to indicate whether they would convict the driver of violating the
speed limit. The responses to this dichotomous question constituted the main
dependent variable of the experiment.45 In addition, in order to probe deeper into
participants’ decision-making processes, we asked them two additional follow-up
questions. Respondents who decided affirmatively with respect to the liability question
were asked to indicate the penalty they would impose on the driver. The penalty could
range from 50 NIS to 1000 NIS (1 NIS roughly equals $0.25). Finally, all responders
were asked to rate the fairness of conviction on the basis of the evidence presented,
using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 indicates “absolutely unfair” and 100 “absolutely
fair.”

45. “Dependent variable” refers to the variables that are explained by the model.
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The two questionnaires were posted on a website designed for controlled judgment
and decision-making experiments. Responders were recruited by an e-mail message
sent to students at the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. To
encourage participation, one out of ten participants was randomly selected to win a
prize of 100 NIS (approximately $25). A total of 88 law students (57 women, 31 men)
who had finished their first year of studies participated in the study.46 These students
ranged in age from 19 to 40, with a mean of 24.
The dependent variable—rate of convictions—differed significantly by condition.47
Whereas 81.4% of the responders in the direct-evidence condition decided to convict
the driver, only 60% of the responders in the inference condition did.48 Even though
both groups faced the same objective probability, and even though both groups faced a
similar situation involving a technological enforcement mechanism, respondents were
far more likely to convict when supplied with direct evidence.49
A more nuanced picture emerged when two follow-up questions were considered.
Counting acquittals as a fine of zero, the average fine in the direct evidence group was
300.3 NIS, and the average fine in the inference group was 286.2 NIS. These averages,
however, were not significantly affected by condition.50 The mean fairness rating of
convicting the driver in the direct-evidence condition (74.8 on a scale of 0 to 100,
where 0 is “absolutely unfair” and 100 “absolutely fair”) was higher than in the
inference condition (66.1 on the same scale). Nonetheless, this difference was only
marginally statistically significant.51 The willingness to convict in the two conditions
was correlated with the judged fairness of conviction, so that controlling for the
judgment of fairness eliminated the effect of condition (direct vs. inference evidence)

46. In Israel, law is studied at the undergraduate level, with students earning an LLB.
47. A significant effect in a statistical measurement refers to the odds that a certain
result was created by chance. In the context of this paper, every time a difference or a result
is presented as “significant,” it means that there is less than a 5% likelihood that this
difference was coincidental. The 5% level of significance is a common threshold used in
statistical analysis in the social sciences. A 6% to 10% level of significance is commonly
considered marginally significant. In technical terms results are significant when the p-value
associated with them is 0.05 or below.
48. Chi-Square=4.835, p=0.028. A chi-square procedure can be used to test the
hypothesis that two different outcomes were obtained by chance. Here we use it to test the
conviction rates in the two conditions. Specifically, we aim to reject the hypothesis that the
difference in the two rates arose due to chance.
49. Both gender and age had no statistically significant main effects and no significant
interactions with the experimental conditions (in this or in any of the following experiments).
50. p=0.832. Similarly, the average fine excluding the acquittals did not significantly
differ between the two conditions (368.9 vs. 477.0 for direct evidence and inference,
respectively, t(60)=1.472, p=0.15).
51. t(86)=1.64, p=0.1.
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on conviction rate.52 However, as will be discussed below, it is unclear what one can
make of this finding.53
B. Experiment 2 (“Enforcement”): Ex Ante Policy Making
Experiment 2 set out to deepen our understanding of the disinclination to base
legal liability on indirect evidence by exploring whether the results obtained in the
first experiment, which focused on an ex post judicial decision, would be replicated
with respect to an ex ante choice of an enforcement system. The shift from an ex
post to an ex ante perspective can prove helpful from both substantive and
methodological perspectives. From a substantive perspective, as noted above, one
explanation of the disinclination to base liability on circumstantial evidence alludes
to the issue of the responsibility of the fact finder for an erroneous judicial outcome
when she wrongfully deduces liability.54 Once the decision is shifted to the policy
context, it is difficult to see any true difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence regarding the responsibility of the policy maker. From a methodological
perspective, the move to a policy question enabled us to employ an alternative
experimental design. Rather than assigning participants randomly to one of two
conditions and comparing the two, we employed a within-subject design in which
subjects revealed their preferences regarding the different types of evidence. Earlier
research suggests that, for the same set of options, tasks that rest on isolated
judgments and tasks that call for comparative judgment may yield different
rankings.55 Replicating the results of the first experiment (between-subject design)
in a within-subject design (the second experiment) could thus bolster our findings.
Participants in Experiment 2 were instructed to imagine that they were members
of a team of experts whose job is to set policy regarding the enforcement of traffic
laws. They were then asked to choose between two speed-enforcement systems.
One system was based on speed-enforcement cameras, as in the direct-evidence
condition of Experiment 1. The other system was based on two cameras
documenting the exact time at which a car passes by, from which it is possible to
infer the driver’s speed, as in the inference condition of Experiment 1. The cost of
purchasing, installing, and operating the two systems was identical, and the
accuracy of both systems was 99%. In order to avoid any potential effect that might
be caused by the label attached to each system, we simply named them A and B.
Furthermore, to assure that decisions were not influenced by the order in which

52. Predicting conviction decision by a logistic regression analysis that includes both the
condition (direct evidence vs. inference as a dummy variable, coded as 1 for direct evidence
and 0 for inference condition) and fairness judgments as independent variables renders the
effect of the condition nonsignificant (B=.782, Wald=1.422, p=.233 and B=.072,
Wald=20.696, p<.001 for condition and fairness, respectively).
53. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
55. See generally Christopher K. Hsee, George F. Loewenstein, Sally Blount & Max H.
Bazerman, Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Options: A
Review and Theoretical Analysis, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 576 (1999) (reviewing the literature
and proposing an explanation for the phenomenon of preference reversal between joint and
separate evaluations).
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participants read about the two systems, the order was varied randomly between
subjects.
Responders were given three options: preference for system A, preference for
system B, and indifference. Responders with a preference for one of the two
systems were then asked whether they would stick with their choice even if it was
98% accurate and the other system remained 99% accurate. Finally, they were
asked to indicate the lowest level of accuracy at which they would still choose their
preferred system over the alternative, assuming the other remained 99% accurate.
Participants in Experiment 2 were recruited voluntarily in one of their law
classes. A total of 49 first-year students participated in the study (31 women, 18
men). Their ages ranged from 18 to 32, with a mean of 23.
The results of the experiment confirmed the existence of a bias against
circumstantial evidence. Of the 49 responders, 53.1% preferred the “directevidence system,” 24.5% preferred the “inference system,” and 22.4% were
indifferent. The percent of responders who preferred the direct-evidence system
was significantly higher than the percent preferring the inference one.56
Of the 26 responders who preferred the direct-evidence system, 11 would have
preferred it even if it was 98% accurate and 13 would not (two did not answer this
question). The mean lowest accuracy they would accept was 95.2%. Of the 12
responders who preferred the inference system, 8 would have preferred it even if it
was 98% accurate and 4 would not. The mean lowest accuracy they would accept
was 92.2%. Although these findings may suggest that subjects, who overcame the
anti-inference bias and preferred the indirect-evidence enforcement regime,
exhibited a stronger preference for this technology relative to the subjects who
preferred the direct-evidence regime, neither the choice proportion nor the
threshold for preference change were significantly different when comparing the
two groups.57
C. Experiment 3 (“Bus”): Conviction Based on Eyewitness Testimony
Experiment 3 was designed to further examine how general the findings of
Experiments 1 and 2 were along several dimensions. First, we wanted to investigate
whether the results were due to any unique feature of the pertinent enforcement
mechanisms. For example, one could conjecture that responders were reluctant to
convict in the inference condition because the two-camera system might have been
perceived as more intrusive and a greater threat to people’s privacy. Thus,
Experiment 3 was designed in a way that such potential issues would not arise.
Second, we wanted to see whether the results of Experiment 1 were a function
of the technological nature of the evidence or whether they would hold for
eyewitness testimony as well. Much of the literature on direct versus circumstantial
evidence deals with the distinction between eyewitness—the paradigmatic direct

56. z=2.953, p<0.01. The order of presentation did not significantly affect preference
(Chi-Square=1.414, p=0.493). Thus, we could treat all subjects as one group. Z-test is the
standard statistical test for comparison of means or proportions.
57. More specifically, the p-values were p=.231 and p=.386 for the comparison of the
choice proportions and the preference change threshold, respectively.
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evidence—and forensic, indirect evidence.58 To control for the explanatory force of
this distinction, Experiment 1 held constant the technological nature of the
evidence across both experimental conditions. Similarly, in Experiment 3 both the
direct evidence group and the inference group were presented with eyewitness
testimony.
Third, we wanted to test whether the results are driven by the responders’
subjective probability estimates. While the design of Experiments 1 and 2 held the
objective probability of a blameworthy behavior constant, subjects might have
assigned different subjective probabilities notwithstanding.59 In order to control for
this somewhat elusive factor, we asked subjects not only to decide whether to
convict the accused but also to assess the probability of guilt.
Finally, we were interested in examining whether the difference between the
two conditions in Experiment 1 had to do with the perceived responsibility-taking
of the decision maker.60 Thus, instead of asking participants how they would decide
the case, we asked them how a judge should decide the case. Presumably, shifting
the act of making a decision to a third party should diminish the responsibility
subjects feel towards their choices.
As in Experiment 1, this experiment used a between-subject design, employing
two versions of a short scenario, followed by a few questions. The two versions
described a tourist bus that was stuck in a sparsely populated area late in the
evening. A policeman who arrived on the scene assisted the driver in arranging for
minibuses to bring the tourists to their destination. In the direct-evidence condition,
the policeman, who got on the bus, saw that there were fifty-four tourists on it,
despite the fact that its permit allowed it to carry only fifty passengers. In the
inference condition, two minibuses arrived empty, were completely filled up, and
drove away. It then turned out that four tourists were left, and an additional vehicle
was summoned for them. Since each minibus had seats for twenty-five passengers,
the policeman inferred that the bus driver had violated the terms of the permit,
which allowed only fifty passengers on the bus. In both scenarios, based on the
policeman’s report, the driver was accused of carrying too many passengers. The
driver pleaded not guilty. The judge had the impression that the policeman was a
reliable person and estimated the likelihood that he had miscounted the passengers
as very low: one in twenty. As elsewhere, the exact same wording was used in both
conditions to describe the possibility of error.61

58. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra notes 26–29, 32–34 and
accompanying text.
59. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
60. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying
text.
61. The vignette did not detail how the policeman knew that there were twenty-five
passenger seats in each minibus, that the minibuses arrived empty, and that the minibuses
were full when they set out. However, since these facts were presented as given, they should
not have affected the reliability of the policeman’s inference. At any rate, the reliability of
the policeman’s count, as assessed by the judge, was described identically in both conditions
in order to eliminate any effect of such hypothetical doubts about the judged probability of
the driver’s guilt.
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After being reminded of the standard of proof in criminal proceedings (“beyond
a reasonable doubt”), participants were asked whether in their opinion the judge
should find the driver guilty. Much like in the Experiment 1, the responses to this
dichotomous question constituted the main dependent variable of the experiment.
Following this question, participants were asked to assess the probability that the
driver had actually transported more passengers than permitted. This second
question allowed us to collect data regarding subjects’ subjective valuation of the
probability of guilt. Finally, participants were asked to rate the fairness of
convicting the driver on a scale of 1 to 9.
Participants in the third experiment were recruited voluntarily in one of their law
classes. A total of 117 first-year law students (59 women, 58 men) answered the
questionnaire during the first week of their studies. They ranged in age from 18 to
36, with a mean of 23. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two
conditions.
The results of the third experiment confirmed the existence of an anti-inference
bias yet again. Whereas 64.8% of the participants in the direct-evidence condition
determined that the judge should convict the driver, only 38.1% of the participants
in the inference condition were of this opinion. This result reflects a highly
significant difference between the two groups.62
Analyzing responders’ subjective valuations regarding liability sheds additional
light on these findings. The participants estimated the probability of the driver
actually violating the terms of the permit as considerably lower than the probability
implied by the vignette. While the chance of miscounting according to the judge’s
impression was described as one in twenty, implying a 95% reliability of the
testimony, the mean estimated probability of the driver actually committing the
violation was 80.1% across the two conditions. More importantly, the mean
probability estimates were not significantly different for the two conditions: 82.2%
and 78.3% for direct-evidence and inference conditions, respectively.63
Furthermore, although—as one would expect—the probability estimate affected
the conviction decision, it did not mediate the effect of the condition. A logistic
regression analysis64 predicting the conviction decision based on the condition
subjects were assigned to (direct evidence vs. inference) and their subjectively
estimated probability yielded significant effects of both probability and condition.65
In other words, the tendency to convict remained significantly lower in the
circumstantial evidence condition, even when controlling for the estimated
probability of guilt. As in Experiment 1, the effect of the condition, direct evidence
versus inference, on the conviction decisions was possibly mediated by the effect of
this factor on judged fairness.66 It is also possible, however, that the similar effects

62. Chi-Square=8.304, p=0.004.
63. p=0.29.
64. Regression analysis is a method that enables documenting the way in which each of
the independent variables influences the value of the dependent variable.
65. B=1.091, Wald=7.092, p<.01 and B=0.038, Wald=11.097, p<0.01 for the effects of
the condition and the subjective probability, respectively.
66. Convicting the driver was perceived as fairer in the direct-evidence condition than in
the inference condition: mean ratings of 6.09 and 4.70 for direct evidence and inference,
respectively, on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 is “absolutely unfair” and 9 “absolutely fair”
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of the condition on the decision to convict and on the perceived fairness of the
conviction reflect two outcomes of the same cognitive process.67
D. Experiment 4 (“Antibiotics”): Forensic Evidence in Civil Litigation
The fourth and final experiment aimed to deal with numerous additional issues
that were not fully addressed in the first three experiments. First, it broadened our
focus to include civil litigation. Civil litigation is distinct from criminal litigation
along several key issues. Of specific relevance to this project is the different
evidentiary threshold employed in civil litigation—preponderance of the
evidence.68 Arguably, the decision threshold might interact with heuristics
associated with the treatment of evidence. For example, people might be more open
towards basing liability on inferences when only money is on the table and when
the plaintiff is only required to establish the case with a probability exceeding 0.5.
Thus, an experiment focusing on a civil dispute allows for a greater generalization
of our findings.
Second, Experiment 4 extended the inquiry to a case where the question was not
whether a wrong had been committed, but rather who had committed it. As the
evidence literature has shown, uncertainty regarding the nature of the act and
uncertainty regarding the identity of the one who committed it generate distinct
effects on the incentives to engage in the regulated behavior.69 Hence, fact finders’
behavior with respect to the two types of uncertainty might possibly differ.
Third, as noted above, some jurisdictions set particularly strict limits on drawing
an inference upon an inference.70 In order to explore whether fact finders share this
aversion toward sequential inferences, the present experiment compared not only
direct and indirect evidence, but also single and double inference. Furthermore, the
comparison between single and double inference allowed us to extend our
(t(115)=3.005, p=.003). Across the two conditions, probability estimates were significantly
correlated with fairness judgment (r=.279, p<.01). The effect of condition (type of evidence)
on fairness judgment was not mediated by probability estimates. A regression analysis
predicting fairness judgment by condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and subjectively
estimated probability yielded significant effects with respect to both probability and
condition (F(114)=7.829, p<.01 and F(114)=8.508, p<.01 for the effects of the condition and
the subjective probability, respectively). As regards the relationship between the conviction
decision and the judged fairness, predicting conviction decision by a logistic regression
analysis that includes both condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and fairness judgment as
independent variables renders the effect of condition nonsignificant (B=1.278, Wald=30.291,
p<.001 and B=.719, Wald=1.090, p=.297 for the effects of fairness and condition,
respectively). Thus, the difference between the two conditions with respect to conviction rate
is no longer significant when we control for judged fairness.
67. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
68. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 568–69; Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss
Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD.
165, 171–82 (2012) (experimentally examining the actual standard of proof in civil
litigation).
69. See Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 327, 329–30 (2006) (distinguishing between mistakes about the act and mistakes
about identity).
70. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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understanding of the role of complexity with respect to fact finders’ attitude
towards circumstantial evidence. Arguably, since a double inference scenario is
more complex than a single inference scenario, complexity would suggest a lower
willingness to convict based on a double inference. If, however, fact finders’ main
concern is the type of evidence (direct or circumstantial), then one would not
necessarily expect a significant difference between the willingness to convict based
on a single or double inference.
Finally, Experiment 4 allowed us to broaden our pool of subjects. While the
participants in the previous experiments were first-year law students (or students
who completed their first year of legal studies), participants in the present
experiment were advanced law students, including master’s candidates (many of
whom are practicing lawyers). Extending the group of subjects to more diverse
populations helps alleviate some of the concerns regarding the external validity of
experimental findings.
We used a between-subject design, employing three versions of a vignette
describing a civil action, followed by three questions. Responders were asked to
imagine that they were serving as a judge in a suit for damages filed by a small
dairy against a dairy farmer. The farmer sells the dairy the milk he produces.
According to the contract, the farmer should make sure that there are no antibiotics
residues in the milk, because such residues obstruct the production of various
products. The milk is delivered to the dairy by a tank truck that transports the milk
of two farmers. Since the milk of the two farmers is mixed in the tank, a sample is
taken from each farmer’s milk before pumping it into the tanker, and the samples
are delivered to a laboratory, where they will be examined should a problem arise.
The dairy claims that the farmer provided milk containing antibiotics residues and,
as a consequence, yogurt production failed and the dairy had to discard all of the
raw materials it had used in this process. As a result, the dairy suffered a loss of
30,000 NIS.
In the direct-evidence condition, when the yogurt-production process failed, the
milk samples of the two farmers were examined. This examination revealed that
there were antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk and no residues in the other
farmer’s milk. The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are
correct (that is, that there were antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk but not
in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%. It is undisputed that the source of the antibiotics
residues could only be milk from one of the farmers.71
In the single-inference condition, when the yogurt-production process failed, the
milk samples from the two farmers were about to be examined (here too, it was
undisputed that the source of the antibiotics residues could only be milk from one
of them), but it turned out that the sample of the defendant’s milk had been lost in
the laboratory and, therefore, it was only possible to examine the other farmer’s
sample. This examination showed no antibiotics residues. The probability that the

71. Arguably, both litigants’ acknowledgement that the production failure was caused
by their milk may be a product of an inferential process in which other conceivable causes
were considered and eliminated. However, in both actual litigation and laboratory
experiments, when a fact is “undisputed,” fact finders and responders need not, and most
likely do not, question the basis of the agreed-upon facts.
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results of the laboratory examination are correct (that is, that there were no
antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%.
In the double-inference condition, when the yogurt-production process failed,
the first possibility examined was that the failure was due to other substances added
to the milk during the process. This examination revealed that none of the other
substances were tainted. When the milk samples from the two farmers were then
about to be examined (here again, it was undisputed that the source of the
antibiotics residues could only be milk from one of the farmers), it turned out that
the sample of the defendant’s milk had been lost in the laboratory and, therefore, it
was only possible to examine the other farmer’s sample. This examination showed
no antibiotics residues. The probability that the results of the laboratory
examinations are correct (that is, that the production failure was not caused by other
substances or by antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%. Based on
the test results of the other substances, the dairy claims that one should infer that
the milk caused the failure of the yogurt-production process, and, based on the
results relating to the other farmer’s sample, one should infer that the defendant
was the one responsible.
Given the somewhat greater complexity of the design of this experiment, special
attention was given to the wording of the probability of error so as to assure that the
conditions did not differ along this dimension. This was achieved by describing the
reliability of the laboratory tests in a way that very clearly referred to the entire
testing process.72
After reading the scenario, responders were asked (1) whether they would accept
the claim, (2) what their assessment of the probability that there were antibiotics
residues in the defendant’s milk was, and (3) how they would rate the fairness of
accepting the claim. The three questionnaires were posted on the same website, and
participants were recruited in the same way as in Experiment 1. To encourage
participation, four participants were randomly selected to win a prize of 150 NIS
each. Responders were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. A total of
193 advanced LLB and LLM students responded to the questionnaire (100 women,
93 men). They ranged in age from 19 to 58, with a mean of 26.
We began analyzing the results by comparing the double-inference group with
the single-inference group. The rate of accepting claims—37% in the doubleinference condition and 44% in the single-inference condition—did not differ
significantly between the two groups.73 Neither did the subjective estimates of
liability. While the estimated probability of the existence of antibiotics residues in
the defendant’s milk was 65.2% in the double-inference group, it was 64.3% in the

72. The three descriptions were as follows. Direct Evidence: “The probability that the
results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is, that there were antibiotics residues
in the defendant’s milk and no such remains in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%”; Single
Inference: “The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is,
that there were no antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%”; Double Inference:
“The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is, that the
failure of production was not caused by the other substances or by antibiotics residues in the
other farmer’s milk) is 85%.”
73. p=0.4.
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single-inference group.74 Given the lack of difference between the single- and
double-inference conditions, we collapsed the data across the two inference
conditions and compared the direct-evidence results to those of the combinedinference conditions.
The rate of accepting the claim differed significantly between the directevidence and the inference groups. Whereas 81.7% of the participants in the directevidence condition accepted the claim, only 40.2% in the inference conditions did.
This difference is highly statistically significant.75 The estimated probability of the
existence of antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk differed significantly
between the two conditions as well. While the mean estimate in the direct-evidence
condition was 81.7%, the equivalent figure with respect to the inference conditions
was only 64.8%.76 Not surprisingly, across all conditions, participants who
indicated that they would accept the claim evaluated the probability of the presence
of antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk higher than participants who did not
accept the claim (80.6% and 69.1%, respectively).77
Nonetheless, although the subjective probability estimates are closely related to
the decision to accept the claim, the difference between the conditions with respect
to the tendency to accept the claim was not mediated by the difference in
probability estimates. A logistic regression predicting the decision to accept the
claim from probability estimate and condition (direct evidence vs. inference, coded
as in Experiment 1) yielded significant effects with respect to both factors.78 In
other words, the tendency to assign legal liability remained significantly lower in
the circumstantial evidence condition even when controlling for fact finders’
subjective probability estimates.79 As in Experiment 3, the effect of condition,
direct evidence versus inference, was possibly mediated by the effect of this factor
on judged fairness.80

74. p=0.8.
75. Chi-Square=31.328, p<0.001.
76. t(191)=6.663, p<0.001.
77. t(191)=8.119, p<0.001.
78. B=.054, Wald=25.666, and B=1.296, Wald=10.976, for probability estimate and
condition, respectively, with p<.01 for both factors.
79. These results differ from the results of the second experiment reported by Arkes et
al., supra note 44, at 282–84. In that experiment, Arkes and his coauthors used vignettes
similar to the tire-tracks scenario of Wells’s experiment, supra note 36, at 743, yet while in
one condition the witness found that the tire tracks matched the blue bus company vehicles,
in the other the witness found that the tracks did not match the grey bus company vehicles.
In both conditions, the technique used was correct 80% of the time. Responders’ willingness
to impose liability on the blue bus company was more than twice as great in the first
condition, and this difference was mediated by their different probability assessments. In
other experiments Arkes and his coauthors describe, the verdict was affected by various
factors without being mediated by the assessed probability. Arkes et al., supra note 44, at
280–82 and 285–88.
80. Predicting a decision to accept the claim by a logistic regression analysis that
includes both condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and fairness judgment as independent
variables renders the effect of condition nonsignificant ( B=1.509, Wald=54.372, p<.001 and
B=.445, Wald=.551, p=.458 for the effects of fairness and condition, respectively).
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III. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part examines the contribution of our findings to the legal literature. We
first outline our main results and discuss them in light of existing theories regarding
the prevalent dissimilar treatment of direct and circumstantial evidence. That done,
we turn to review the potential normative implications that can be drawn from
them. Finally, we highlight some of the limitations of the study and sketch out
paths for future research.
A. General Discussion
All four experiments demonstrated an anti-inference bias: the respondents were
far more reluctant to impose liability based solely on circumstantial evidence than
on direct evidence. This reluctance was manifest across different scenarios; was
true for both criminal and civil liability; was common to technological, scientific,
and eyewitness evidence; and was evident both when the disputed question was
whether a wrong had been committed and when the question was who had
committed the wrong. In all four experiments, the anti-inference bias characterized
case-specific circumstantial evidence rather than merely statistical evidence. We
found a strong disinclination to base liability on circumstantial evidence in both
between- and within-subject experimental designs; in both ex post judicial decision
making and ex ante policy making; and both when responders made the decision
themselves and when they specified how another person should decide. This was
true of students at the beginning of their first year of law school and of advanced
LLB and LLM students. Furthermore, while the type of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, sometimes affected the subjectively assessed probability of the
defendant’s fault, in none of the experiments did it mediate the effect of the type of
evidence on the decision whether to impose liability.
As the following analysis demonstrates, our findings extend the existing
literature on circumstantial evidence. While the explanations for the differential
treatment accorded to circumstantial evidence put forward by this body of literature
might be valid, they cannot account for the full scope of this phenomenon. The
experiments suggest that there is another aspect of human decision making that is
driving fact finders’ behavior.
The first body of explanations highlighted by the existing literature focuses on
objective probabilities or on fact finders’ subjective probability assessments.81 Our
findings, however, suggest that these factors cannot fully account for people’s
reluctance to impose legal liability based on indirect evidence. In Experiment 1
(Highway), Experiment 3 (Bus), and Experiment 4 (Antibiotics), the objective
probability that the defendant had committed the act attributed to him was identical
in the direct-evidence and the inference conditions, yet the responders’ willingness
to impose legal liability differed markedly. In the same vein, despite the identical
accurateness of the two enforcement systems in Experiment 2 (Enforcement), the
responders strongly preferred the direct-evidence system over the inference one.
The assumption that circumstantial evidence is inherently less conclusive than

81. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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direct evidence thus cannot explain the prevalent disinclination to impose liability
based on such evidence.
As for subjective probability assessments, despite the fact that there was no
significant difference between responders’ mean probability assessments in the two
conditions in Bus, about 65% of the responders found the driver guilty of violating
the terms of the permit in the direct-evidence condition, but only 38% did so in the
inference condition. In Antibiotics, while there were significant differences in the
subjective probability assessments between the two conditions, these differences
did not mediate the difference in the responders’ willingness to accept the claim
under the two conditions, as this difference remained significant even when we
controlled for the differences in probability assessments. In this regard, our findings
are in line with previous results;82 yet, they generalize the previous results and
expose a wide-ranging bias against circumstantial evidence that is not limited to the
context of statistical and forensic evidence. In all of our experiments, conditions
differed with regard to the directness of the evidence, but not with regard to
whether the evidence was statistical, scientific, or eyewitness. Our findings also
extend the previous experimental findings in covering criminal cases (Highway,
Enforcement, and Bus) in addition to civil ones (Antibiotics); an ex ante choice
between enforcement systems (Enforcement) in addition to ex post judicial
decisions (Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics); and within-subject (Enforcement) in
addition to between-subject design (Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics).
The incompatibility of our findings with the subjective probability explanation
indicates that explanations building on the greater complexity of circumstantial
evidence cannot fully account for the responders’ disinclination to rely on this type
of evidence. Had the fact finders been reluctant to impose liability based on
circumstantial evidence because of their difficulty in understanding and drawing
conclusions from such evidence, one would expect this difficulty to affect, first and
foremost, the judged probability of the defendant’s fault, and that we would find a
correlation between the subjective probability assessment and the responders’
willingness to impose liability. Moreover, while in Antibiotics the circumstantial
evidence (particularly in the double-inference condition) was indeed more complex
than in the direct-evidence condition, this can hardly be said of Highway,
Enforcement, and Bus. Finally, in Antibiotics there was a considerable difference
between the single-inference and double-inference conditions in terms of their
complexity, but no significant difference in terms of the responders’ willingness to
impose liability. Thus, complexity and clarity of the evidence cannot fully account
for the general phenomenon we identified in our experiments.
Another explanation for the different treatment given to circumstantial evidence
builds on the abstract and pallid nature of such evidence.83 However, the evidence
presented in all four experiments in both conditions was of the exact same character
(e.g., eyewitness testimony or scientific/technological) and did not involve naked
statistical evidence. This would indicate that the explanations based on the relative
representational versus abstract, narrative versus rhetorical, unconditional versus

82. See Arkes et al., supra note 44, at 280−90; Niedermeier et al., supra note 38,
534−41; Wells, supra note 36, at 741−48.
83. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
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probabilistic, vivid versus pallid, concrete versus general, and emotional versus
unexciting nature of the evidence are incomplete. For instance, in Highway and
Enforcement, the evidence produced by the one-camera and two-camera systems
was equally abstract, probabilistic, pallid, concrete, and unexciting.
Similar observations apply to the case-specificity argument, according to which
naked statistical evidence is insufficient for imposing liability, even when the
probability is very high, because the weight or resiliency of the evidence is equally
important. According to this argument, if the assessed probability rests on too little
information or on general, non-case-specific evidence, it should not be relied upon
in order to determine liability.84 While it is easy to equate naked statistical evidence
and circumstantial evidence, the two represent distinct issues. None of our
experiments included naked statistical evidence. Rather, they all involved casespecific evidence that was either direct or circumstantial. It is unclear why, for
example, in Highway one would consider the results of the two-camera system as
having less weight or as less resilient than the results of the one-camera system.
Our findings also suggest that the reluctance to impose liability based on
circumstantial evidence is not necessarily a matter of responsibility taking.85
According to the responsibility-taking theory, when relying on direct evidence, the
fact finder feels less accountable for erroneous judgments because it is not her
inference, but rather the witness’s fallibility or dishonesty that brought about the
regrettable judicial error. As a result, the fact finder is less hesitant to impose
liability based on direct evidence.
When viewing the decisions subjects made in all experiments through the prism
of responsibility taking, it is clear that there was no real difference between the two
conditions used in the Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics scenarios in this regard.
Certainly no issue of responsibility taking was involved in the Enforcement
experiment, where responders were asked to choose between two speedenforcement systems ex ante—in the abstract—rather than to impose liability on
any particular person. Furthermore, in Bus, responders were not asked to make the
decision themselves, but rather to indicate how another person—the judge—should
decide. This did not, however, counteract the responders’ reluctance to rely on
circumstantial circumstances.86
The experiments show that the fact-to-evidence theory cannot fully account for
fact finders’ behavior either.87 The fact-to-evidence theory posits that people are far
more inclined to rely on evidence when the decision of whether to impose liability
bears on the reliability of the evidence. Our findings, however, do not support this
conjecture.88 For instance, in both conditions of the Bus experiment, convicting the

84. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
86. Our vignettes also varied in terms of the identity of the person who drew the
inference. In Highway and Enforcement, it was “possible to infer” from the indirect
evidence; in Bus, “the policeman inferred”; and in Antibiotics the plaintiff urged the court
(that is, the responder) to infer. Arguably, responders should have experienced greater
personal responsibility in Antibiotics and less in Bus. In fact, the disinclination to impose
inference-based liability was common to all four scenarios.
87. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
88. In this regard our findings corroborate the findings of Niedermeier, Kerr, and Messé.
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driver implied that the policeman’s testimony was very reliable, and acquitting the
driver implied that it was insufficiently reliable; yet there was a huge difference
between the two conditions in the willingness to convict.89
We then turn to the ease-of-simulation theory.90 As originally conceived by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky91 and subsequently studied in various
contexts,92 the simulation heuristic pertains to how likely one thinks it is that an
outcome will occur or an event has occurred (or could have occurred). According to
the theory, the easier it is to imagine a scenario (and the harder it is to imagine a
competing one), the more probable it appears to be.93 Several scholars have tied
this pattern of thinking to the way in which fact finders treat circumstantial
evidence.94 The core argument is that, by its very nature, circumstantial evidence
makes it easier to imagine alternative scenarios in which the defendant is not liable.
As a result, fact finders will systematically under-assess the probability that the
defendant is liable when asked to base liability on circumstantial evidence.
The ease-of-simulation heuristic cannot explain fact finders’ disinclination to
impose liability based on circumstantial evidence in the experiments reported in
this Article. As both Bus and Antibiotics suggest, this disinclination is not based on
a cognitive process that is tied to participants’ judgments of probabilities. In the
former, no difference was found between the direct and the circumstantial groups
with respect to probability assessments; in the latter, the disinclination remained
significant even when controlling for the differences in subjective probability.
Explaining the reluctance to base liability on purely circumstantial evidence by the

See Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 536−39.
89. In Enforcement, it could hardly be argued that choosing one system necessarily
implied that it was more accurate than the alternative. In that experiment, 38 of 49
responders preferred one of the systems (one-camera/direct system or two-camera/inference
system) to the other. Of those 38, 19 (50%) would stick with their preferred choice even if its
accuracy were lower than that of the alternative.
90. See supra notes 35−41 and accompanying text.
91. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 37.
92. See, e.g., Ariel S. Levi & John B. Pryor, Use of the Availability Heuristic in
Probability Estimates of Future Events: The Effects of Imagining Outcomes Versus
Imagining Reasons, 40 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 219, 222−29 (1987)
(examining the factors affecting people’s prediction of who will win the elections); David
Raune, Andrew MacLeod & Emily A. Holmes, The Simulation Heuristic and Visual
Imagery in Pessimism for Future Negative Events in Anxiety, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHOTHERAPY 313, 315−21 (2005) (studying the assessed probability of future negative
events by patients suffering from clinical anxiety).
93. The ease of simulation may depend on the ease of simulating other similar events,
Dale T. Miller, William Turnbull & Cathy McFarland, When a Coincidence Is Suspicious:
The Role of Mental Simulation, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 581, 583−86 (1989),
and counterfactuals, Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A
Consider-an-Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1069, 1072−83 (1995), as well as on the perceived normality of different events,
Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93
PSYCHOL. REV. 136, 137 (1986); Miller et al., supra note 93. The ease of simulation is to
some extent manipulable. See, e.g., Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 539−41.
94. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 1; Niedermeier et al., supra note 38; Sykes & Johnson,
supra note 40.
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ease-of-simulation heuristic thus does not fall in line with the conventional
meaning of this heuristic that is directly tied to an estimate of the likelihood of an
event.
Moreover, to a large degree our vignettes were designed to eliminate alternative
explanations and thus rule out the influence of this heuristic. For instance, in the
inference condition in Highway, given the distance between the two cameras and
the time that elapsed between the documenting of the car by each camera, there is
simply no way the driver did not violate the speed limit. True, one could imagine
an error in the system, but the phrasing of both conditions was identical in this
respect: “The probability of an error in the camera system is 2%.” Similarly, in the
inference condition of Bus, the only explanation for the fact that four tourists were
left behind after the two minibuses that arrived empty were filled up and drove
away is that there were fifty-four passengers on the tourist bus.95 Any alternative
explanation was ruled out, as the questionnaire explicitly stated that fifty people
were driven away on the two minibuses.96
Last we consider the fairness explanation arguably supported by our findings. In
Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics there was a statistically significant positive
correlation between subjects’ decisions to impose liability and their judged fairness
of doing so. However, it is unclear how this correlation should be interpreted. One
possibility is that imposition of liability is unfair because it is prone to error due to
either the inherent inconclusiveness of circumstantial evidence or its lesser weight
and resiliency. However, this does not seem to be the notion of fairness envisioned
by the responders, as in none of the experiments was the imposition of liability
mediated by the assessed probability that the defendant actually committed the act,
and in all experiments the evidence was case specific.97

95. The lack of a statistically significant difference between the subjective probability
assessments in the two conditions suggests that subjects did not view an alternative scenario
as plausible.
96. Interestingly, despite its centrality in the literature, the ease-of-simulation theory
fails to provide a complete explanation for the different treatment of direct and
circumstantial evidence even in Niedermeier and his coauthors’ own study. Niedermeier et
al., supra note 38. Their study directly tested the mediating effect of the ease-of-simulation
variable on verdicts in two of its experiments. While in both experiments the ease of
simulation affected the verdicts, in neither did it fully mediate the effect of type of evidence.
Id. at 536−41. Although controlling for ease of simulation considerably reduced the
proportion of variance in the verdicts, there remained a statistically significant difference
between the verdicts in the different conditions. Id. at 538, 541. Thus, even according to
Niedermeier and his coauthors, the ease of simulation provides an incomplete explanation
for factfinders’ behavior. A more elaborate examination of the ease-of-simulation
explanation was recently conducted by Arkes and his coauthors. Arkes et al., supra note 44.
They found that sometimes this factor (which they dub “imaginability”) possibly mediates
the verdict, yet sometimes it is unrelated to the verdict or even related in a manner
completely contrary to the ease-of-simulation hypothesis. Id. at 282–86.
97. It may also be argued that in Highway, the speed-camera system was perceived as
fairer because it is more forgiving: It does not penalize drivers who violate the speed limit in
the parts of the highway not covered by a speed camera, that is, most of the road. However,
the two-camera system is more forgiving in the sense that it only captures the driver’s
average speed in the pertinent section of the road, which is typically lower than the highest
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A different notion of fairness might have to do with people’s expectations and
the “rules of the game.” Perhaps people believe that they should only be penalized
if they are caught in the act. Imposing an inference-based liability is thus seen as
unfair, regardless of the reliability of the circumstantial evidence. While such a
notion of fairness possibly plays a role in some contexts, it can hardly serve as a
general explanation for the reluctance to impose inference-based liability. First, it is
unclear that, in deciding whether to impose criminal or civil liability, people
consider the wrongdoer’s expectations as to the type of evidence that might be used
against her. Second, when one’s behavior harms another person, as in Antibiotics
and in Wells’s blue bus scenario,98 not compensating the injured party because the
evidence supporting her claim is not the type expected by the defendant seems
considerably more unfair than using such evidence. Finally, the present notion of
fairness does not account for the disinclination to rely on circumstantial evidence
even when the pertinent evidence, such as forensic evidence found at the scene of
the crime, has long been used by the police and is now part of the “rules of the
game.”99
At the end of the day, it may well be that the responders in our experiments
understood “fair” as roughly equivalent to “appropriate” or “acceptable.” The
decision to impose criminal or civil liability and the characterization of the
imposition of liability as fair echoed one another, possibly reflecting the same
cognitive process. Thus, the answer to the fairness question was possibly a post hoc
rationalization of responders’ answers to the verdict question.
To sum up, our findings show that the reluctance of fact finders to impose
liability based solely on indirect, circumstantial evidence is stronger and further
reaching than demonstrated in previous studies. None of the explanations proposed
thus far for this reluctance are completely satisfactory. Our findings reveal an
independent, deeply rooted anti-inference heuristic.
Much like other simplifying heuristics, the anti-inference heuristic assists people
to make judgments under uncertainty. It functions as a substitute for extensive
algorithmic processing and yields judgments that are usually accurate. Ordinarily,
when we see something with our own eyes, or when someone tells us that she saw
something herself, that event actually happened; this is not necessarily true of
conclusions drawn from circumstantial evidence. We tend to trust our power of
vision more than we trust our power of deduction. However—like other biases and
heuristics—the anti-inference heuristic also gives rise to systematic error; it
strongly affects decisions even when the objective and subjective probabilities of
the pertinent occurrence are equal according to circumstantial and direct
evidence.100 The anti-inference heuristic may thus be seen as yet another
speed she drove in that section.
98. Wells, supra note 36.
99. The rules of the game may change over time. Thus, while speed cameras have come
to be regarded as a commonplace in Israel (where the experiments were conducted), twocamera systems of the kind described in Highway and Enforcement are not ordinarily used in
Israel and can thus be perceived as unfair. Even if this conjecture helps to explain the results
of Highway and Enforcement, it does not seem relevant to Bus or Antibiotics.
100. There is an intriguing correspondence between our findings and the findings of
experiments studying young children’s overly rigid application of a “seeing = knowing” rule
according to which facts can only be determined through direct evidence and not through
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manifestation of overgeneralization. It reflects an inability of people to perfectly
analyze the decision environment in which they function. While preferring to rely
on direct evidence might be a prudent strategy in day-to-day life, in some contexts,
it might be a problematic decision-rule.
B. Policy Implications
Having described the positive findings of our experiments, we now turn to
analyze their potential normative implications.101 First, we explore the implications
for the rules governing the structure of trials. In this regard, we examine whether
legal systems can adopt strategies that will debias fact finders. We then turn to
examine the implications for evidence law and for substantive legal rules. As the
discussion will show, legal systems anticipating the anti-inference bias adopt legal
presumptions and structure prohibitions that, to a certain degree, circumvent it.
1. Debiasing Fact Finders
The existence of a systematic aversion towards basing liability on circumstantial
evidence suggests that like other heuristics, the anti-inference bias might drive
judicial decision making astray. Thus, legal systems will be able to improve the
quality of fact finding by circumventing the bias through proper regulation. Just as
the legal system might try to overcome cognitive phenomena such as the hindsight
bias,102 it might also try to debias fact finders influenced by the anti-inference bias.
A straightforward avenue to attempt counteracting the anti-inference bias is
instructing fact finders to afford equal weight to direct and circumstantial evidence.
Numerous jurisdictions have taken this path by stressing in their jury instructions
that direct and circumstantial evidence are in principle equally reliable.103 In
Connecticut, for example, the instructions state that: “There is no legal distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative value; the law
inference. See, e.g., Ori Friedman, Richard Griffin, Hiram Brownell & Ellen Winner,
Problems with the Seeing = Knowing Rule, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 505, 506−07 (2003)
(presenting a critical review of the literature on the matter); Ted Ruffman, Do Children
Understand the Mind by Means of Simulation or a Theory? Evidence from Their
Understanding of Inference, 11 MIND & LANGUAGE 388, 393−400 (1996) (reporting
experimental findings documenting the phenomenon).
101. To be sure, in the following analysis we focus our discussion on the possibility that
fact finders exhibit excessive caution towards circumstantial evidence, and not excessive
confidence towards direct evidence. To the extent the latter option reflects the decisionmaking pattern, the proposals outlined in this Part should be adjusted accordingly.
102. See, e.g., D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Jurors’ Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION SCI. 401, 408−16 (1994) (presenting
experimental findings on successful debiasing in the hindsight context); David B. Wexler &
Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health
Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485, 489−92
(1989) (exploring debiasing strategies in the context of the hindsight bias).
103. See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Bain, A Proposed Definition of Reasonable Doubt and the
Demise of the Circumstantial Evidence Charge Following Hankins v. State, 15 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 353, 362 (1984) (noting the equal weight now afforded to circumstantial evidence in
different jurisdictions).
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permits you to give equal weight to both, but it is for you to decide how much
weight to give to any particular evidence.”104 Arguably, legislatures specifying such
instructions both acknowledge the existence of the anti-inference bias, and attempt
to deal with it by offering jurors proper guidance.
The effectiveness of such instructions, however, is not self-evident. The research
on jury instructions in other areas suggests that instructions are often ineffective
since juries tend to disregard them.105 In the context of the right to remain silent, for
example, studies have documented the tendency of jurors to hold the exercise of
this right against defendants despite explicit instructions not to do so. Thus, after
conducting a series of stylized experiments on the issue, David Shaffer concluded
that “this bias against defendants who invoked the Fifth Amendment was apparent
even though the judge had affirmed the defendant’s right to so plead and had
instructed jurors that they were to draw no inferences about the defendant’s
innocence or guilt from his use of this constitutional privilege.”106
Furthermore, in some cases the strategy of jury instructions might even backfire
and do more harm than good.107 In the context of information about previous
convictions, for instance, Kerri Pickel demonstrated that people are more likely to
convict after being exposed to information regarding past convictions if they are
instructed to disregard that information.108 Similarly, once the circumstantial nature
of evidence is made salient by the instructions, jurors might be drawn to discount
their probative value.
A second path policy makers might choose to take in order to deal with the antiinference bias is to bring it to the attention of fact finders. According to this line of
thought, courts should allow for expert witness testimony that will explain to fact
finders the precise pitfalls associated with the anti-inference bias.109 Arguably, a
detailed scientific explanation on the bias might prove more effective than standard
jury instructions that are easy to ignore. From a legal perspective, allowing for
expert testimony regarding the anti-inference bias should not face insurmountable
difficulties. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence grants judges broad
discretion over the admissibility of expert witness testimony.110 That said, one

104. CONN. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.4-1 (2007) (modified 2008).
105. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting
Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 703
(2000) (stating that “the majority of extant empirical research indicates that jurors do not
adhere to limiting instructions”).
106. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 124, 143 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985).
107. See Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 105, at 689−91 (reviewing the evidence on the
“backfire” effect caused by limiting instructions).
108. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 411−15 (1995).
109. For a similar proposal in the context of the hindsight bias, see Wexler & Schopp,
supra note 102, at 490−92.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (establishing a broad standard that enables courts to admit
evidence that can help the trier of fact “understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue”).
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should acknowledge the limitation of this solution. Expert evidence is costly,111 and
it is unclear whether litigating parties will find it beneficial to invest the necessary
resources in producing it. When the stakes are relatively low, as they so often are,
an expert witness will probably not justify the costs associated with summoning her
to court.
Finally, while the issue of debiasing raises numerous practical questions relating
to the feasibility of such policies, it also raises a more principled dilemma. If the
anti-inference bias reflects deeply held epistemological and moral intuitions,
circumventing it might adversely affect the desirable correspondence between
peoples’ prevalent perceptions and the outcomes of adjudication. As Jeffrey
Rachlinski concluded, a judgment produced by a debiased trier of fact “might seem
less fair than an uncorrected, biased judgment.”112 Our findings substantiate this
concern. In Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics, we asked the responders not only to
decide (or indicate how a judge should decide) the case, but also to assess the
fairness of imposing liability. In all three experiments, there was a statistically
significant positive correlation between the answers to the two questions: The fairer
the responders judged the imposition of liability, the likelier they were to convict
the defendant or accept the claim. Put differently, people’s reluctance to impose
liability based on indirect evidence correlates with their belief that imposing such
liability is less “fair.”113
Counteracting the anti-inference bias might therefore adversely affect the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal system. A significant body of work has
demonstrated the importance of the perceived fairness of the criminal justice
system for its effectiveness.114 More recently, scholars have extended this argument
and suggested that perceived fairness might play a key role in fostering cooperation
in civil contexts as well.115 Deciphering the precise connections between the antiinference bias, circumventing it, and perceptions of fairness, lies beyond the scope
of this Article. Nonetheless, any legal treatment of the issue will have to take this
issue into account.

111. See, e.g., Monique Michal, Comment, After West Virginia: The Fate of Expert
Witness Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1992) (reviewing
the high costs associated with expert witnesses).
112. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 601 (1998).
113. See supra notes 52−53, 66−67, 80, 97−98 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice:
The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 211, 212−13 (2012) (pointing to the “significant crime-control advantages
for a system that enjoys perceptions of both moral credibility and legitimacy”); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18−32 (2007) (reviewing the undesirable implications
of policies that distribute punishment in a way that does not accord with shared intuitions of
justice); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
454 (1997) (advocating a criminal law that reflects “the community’s perceptions of just
desert”).
115. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations
Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 36 (2011) (noting the connection between perceived
fairness and contractual compliance).
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2. Rules of Evidence
Aware of the challenges associated with direct debiasing, legal policy makers
may resort to indirect measures in order to deal with the anti-inference bias. The
obvious example is the introduction of legal presumptions. The law often resorts to
presumptions in order to assign liability.116 A presumption allows “the existence of
an ultimate fact, or presumed fact, to be taken as established where other predicate
or basic facts have been established.”117 Thus, for example, defendants who cannot
present a reasonable explanation for the fact that they are in possession of recently
stolen goods might be convicted of stealing those goods based on a presumption
deducing theft from possession.118 Similarly, drugs that are found in the
defendant’s home might be assumed to be in his possession based on a presumption
connecting the two.119 Interestingly, the use of such presumptions is not limited to
jurisdictions that delegate fact finding to nonprofessional jurors.120
Despite their prevalence, the existence of legal presumptions is somewhat
puzzling. As courts often note, presumptions rest on the existence of a “commonsense” connection between the fact that was established and the fact that is deduced
from it.121 Actually, such a connection is a precondition for the constitutionality of
the presumption.122 On its face, there is no need to instruct fact finders to use
common sense when determining facts, since that is what they are expected to do
whether instructed or not. As one judge noted, she would be “hard-pressed” if
asked by jurors for clarifications regarding how they should implement a
presumption.123
The anti-inference bias offers an explanation for the pervasiveness of legal
presumptions.124 Given the ability of presumptions “‘to encourage’ the jury to find

116. In the following discussion we focus on legal presumptions in the context of criminal
law, though this phenomenon clearly goes well beyond this body of law. For example, in
family law presumptions play an important role with respect to key issues. See Brie S. Rogers,
Note, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A Triumph of Law over Biology,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1151, 1151−52 (2002) (noting that the presumption of paternity is deeply
rooted in American legal tradition).
117. Theodore A. Gottfried & Peter G. Baroni, Presumptions, Inferences and Strict
Liability in Illinois Criminal Law: Preempting the Presumption of Innocence?, 41 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 715 (2008).
118. See, e.g., Lynn McLain, “Other Acts” Evidence: Recent Decisions by the Court of
Appeals Undermine the Efficacy of Maryland Rule 5-404(b), 31 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 9 (2000)
(noting that this is a well-established presumption under Maryland law).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1998).
120. See, e.g., CA 9282/00 Yarchi v. State of Israel PD 55(5) 759 [2001] (Isr.) (Israeli
Supreme Court ruling that presence at the scene of the crime creates a presumption that the
defendant was an accomplice to the crime).
121. Proof Issues, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 696, 706 (2011) (reviewing the case
law).
122. Id.
123. People v. Thomas, 407 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978).
124. We do not argue that the anti-inference bias is the sole explanation for the existence of
legal presumptions. For other arguments see, for example, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward A
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fact B . . . once fact A . . . is proven,”125 one could view them as a mild form of
regulation that counteracts the effect of the bias. By adopting presumptions, the law
pushes fact finders to make common-sense deductions they might otherwise be
reluctant to make. Thus, presumptions help steer fact finders towards more accurate
decisions.
3. Substantive Legal Rules
Thus far our analysis has focused on the implications of the anti-inference bias
on adjudication. This mode of analysis is in line with traditional legal scholarship
that envisions a division of labor between substantive legal rules and the rules of
evidence and procedure.126 Whereas substantive legal rules aim to promote the
general goals of the legal system such as fairness, just desert, and efficiency, the
rules of evidence and procedure focus on advancing the goals of the judicial
process, such as enhancement of accuracy of fact finding and desirable
apportionment of the risk of error.127
Recent research, however, has demonstrated that this dichotomous view of the
legal system is inaccurate. On one hand, the rules governing the legal process are,
or at least should be, attuned to the primary goals of the legal system.128 For
example, the rules of evidence might mediate between deterrence and retribution as
the guiding principle of criminal law.129 On the other hand, substantive rules might
be used to reduce the risk of judicial error. For instance, sanctions can be calibrated
such that they reduce the probability of wrongful convictions.130
In the context of the anti-inference bias, policy makers aware of its existence
might choose to deal with it by structuring prohibitions in a way that will overcome
fact finders’ reluctance to deduce liability. One strategy in this regard is to broaden
the scope of prohibitions, such that they not only encompass the primary behavior
that the policy maker wishes to regulate, but also related behaviors from which one
could deduce that the primary behavior took place. By adopting such a legislative
strategy, the state no longer needs to persuade fact finders to infer liability, as the
inference was already determined by the legislature.

Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 (1992) (arguing that presumptions
function as a desirable middle point between rule based regimes and equity based regimes).
125. Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified
Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 335 (1980).
126. See, e.g., Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the
Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 609−10 (2012) (highlighting the perceived division of labor
within law).
127. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 30, at 1.
128. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 762−72 (2012)
(analyzing, inter alia, the effect of burden of proof on primary activities); Chris William
Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 280−86
(2008) (same).
129. See generally Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal
Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197 (2007).
130. See Guttel & Teichman, supra note 126, at 607−10.
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Criminalizing preparation to commit a crime is a case in point. Preparatory
offenses are closely related to the law of criminal attempts.131 Criminalizing
attempts promotes important policy goals such as deterrence and prevention. From
a deterrence perspective, it allows punishing offenders even when they fail to
complete their plan, and thus cheaply raises the probability of punishment.132 From
a prevention perspective, it enables the police to intervene prior to the completion
of the criminal act and empowers the state to incapacitate individuals who
demonstrate a propensity for criminal activity.133 Thus, it is unsurprising that most
jurisdictions criminalize attempts in one way or another.134
Securing convictions in attempt cases might, however, prove a thorny task since
they always involve situations in which at least one of the objective elements of the
crime is absent.135 According to the Model Penal Code, to commit an attempt, an
actor must take “a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in
his commission of the crime.”136 Thus, in cases involving incomplete attempts, fact
finders are left to deduce missing elements of the criminal plan from circumstantial
evidence. If, for example, a suspect is apprehended near a bank with a gun and a
demand note, the fact finder will have to infer based on circumstantial evidence
what would have happened had the police not intervened. Fact finders subject to
the anti-inference bias are expected to exhibit a special aversion towards convicting
people of such attempts.137
As policy makers become aware of the reluctance to convict in criminal attempt
cases, they can try to overcome this reluctance by redesigning criminal
prohibitions. Specifically, they could define certain acts of preparation as
independent crimes. Once the possession of burglary tools or the conducting of a
sexual conversation over the Internet with a minor are defined as crimes,138 fact

131. Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 407,
414 (2008) (noting that “[t]he essence of a preparatory crime is a criminal attempt”).
132. See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
435, 436−37 (1990).
133. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 581−83 (4th ed. 2003) (analyzing criminal
attempts from the perspective of early prevention); Shavell, supra note 132, at 458 (analyzing
criminal attempts from the perspective of incapacitation).
134. R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 1 (1996).
135. See Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts—Legality and the Legal
Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 670 (1969).
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
137. For examples of cases demonstrating the difficulty to assign liability in such situations,
see United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1147−48 (9th Cir. 1994) (defendants sitting in a car
outside of a bank at 10:00 PM equipped with two handguns, ammunition, a roll of duct tape, a
stun gun, and a pair of latex surgical gloves after tampering with the bank’s ATM in order to
draw the service personnel to the bank, did not take a substantial step toward robbing the bank);
United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 608 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant sitting in a car near a bank
wearing a blond wig, equipped with a fake bomb, a pouch with a demand note taped to it, a
police scanner, and a notebook containing drafts of demand notes, and who later confessed that
the police caught him “five minutes before [he] was going to rob a bank” did not take a
substantial step towards robbing the bank).
138. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35 (McKinney 2010) (criminalizing the possession of
burglars’ tools); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013) (defining the
crime of enticing a minor).
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finders no longer have to deduce what the defendant would have done in order to
punish him.139 Rather, they can assign liability based on direct evidence.140 In fact,
numerous scholars have taken a view that the practical effect of offences such as
possession of burglars’ tools is to “shift the burden” to defendants regarding the
nature of their activity.141 In other words, they might serve as an antidote to the
anti-inference bias in criminal attempt cases.
To be sure, while our analysis highlights a possible explanation for the
prevalence of preparatory offences, it does not necessarily justify them. Preparatory
offences might effectively overcome the anti-inference bias, yet they might unjustly
intrude on individual liberty,142 and, given their wide scope, they might deter
socially beneficial behavior.143 The current discussion is therefore closely tied to
the discussion on debiasing. Inasmuch as legal systems are better able to deal with
the anti-inference bias, the need for preparatory offences is expected to diminish.
Other things being equal, a shift from the current regime—of broad prohibitions
coupled with biased fact finders that are reluctant to impose liability—to a regime
of narrow prohibitions that are enforced by unbiased fact finders, seems desirable.
It will enable fact finders to avoid punishing blameless behavior while assuring that
those who deserve to be punished will not escape liability.
C. Limitations and Future Research
In this final subpart, we acknowledge potential criticisms to this project, and
outline potential avenues of future research that could help address these limitations
and further our understanding of the anti-inference bias.
As is always the case with experimental work, one should be cautious regarding
the external validity of our findings. A courtroom is not a decision-making lab, and

139. To be sure, such laws generally require a state of mind relating the completion of the
underlying offence. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35. Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that
such prohibitions widen the scope of liability for inchoate crimes. See State v. Ansari, 100
P.3d 231, 237−38 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing the Utah Internet enticement law as
aimed towards broadening the scope of liability); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Inchoate Crimes
at the Prevention/Punishment Divide, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1273, 1283 (2011) (viewing
preparatory offenses as a way in which legislature broaden the domain of liability).
140. As in the context of legal presumptions, see supra note 124, we do not argue that the
anti-inference bias is the sole explanation for the existence of such crimes. For additional
arguments, see, for example, Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 913 (2004) (tying between the phenomenon and prosecutorial
discretion); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 17−19 (2006) (tying
between the phenomenon and the difficulties to present evidence in court).
141. See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 97 (1989); see
also ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 467 (2d ed. 1995).
142. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 784
(1997) (noting that such crimes “give[] liberty a strong kick in the teeth right at the start”);
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 853, 884 (2011) (arguing that such crimes “run directly counter to notions of due
process and fairness in the criminal justice system”).
143. See, e.g., Daniel Ohana, Responding to Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a
Crime: Criminalization or Prevention?, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 28 (2006) (noting the
chilling effect of preparatory offences).
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different forces might interact with the anti-inference heuristic during judicial
proceedings. In this regard, future research should study decisions made by both
judges and jurors, and explore the extent to which the bias drives actual rulings.
While exploring this question in a quantitative manner might prove a difficult task,
additional methodologies such as systematic qualitative studies of jurors might
prove useful.
Future research should also pay special attention to the role of two key figures
that can play a critical role with respect to the anti-inference bias. Arguably, given
their role as repeat players, lawyers are well aware of the precise scope of the bias.
Thus, defense lawyers might attempt to strengthen the bias in order to make a
favorable outcome more probable.144 Framing evidence as merely circumstantial
seems to be a routine tactic of the defense.145 These lawyers might exacerbate the
anti-inference bias by pointing to the existence of alternative explanations for the
circumstantial evidence. As demonstrated by Niedermeier and his colleagues, a
defense lawyer’s argument that highlights alternative causal possibilities can be an
effective way to bring about a significant decline in the inclination of fact finders to
assign liability.146 Furthermore, by making those alternative scenarios as vivid as
possible—for instance, by using computer simulations—lawyers can render this
strategy even more effective.147 Mapping out the precise way defense lawyers use
the bias could shed more light on the intricate details of the bias. Similarly,
studying the way in which prosecutors and plaintiff lawyers attempt to overcome
those efforts might point towards effective debiasing techniques.
A second group of players that merits specific research are judges. While there
is no reason to assume that the psychology of legally trained subjects, including
judges, differs fundamentally from that of other people—and some studies have
indeed demonstrated that it does not148—some studies do show that professionals
can learn to employ debiasing mechanisms.149 More fundamentally, one must be
exceedingly cautious in deriving normative conclusions from laboratory results, as
it is unclear to what extent the anti-inference bias persists in the face of legal

144. For a general analysis of the connection between jurors’ decision-making patterns and
the type of arguments advocates make, see Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How
Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 61 (1995).
145. Cf. Bergman, supra note 9, at 985 (describing lawyers in movies).
146. Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 539−41 (reporting the results of Experiment 3).
147. See, e.g., Meghan A. Dunn, Peter Salovey & Neal Feigenson, The Jury Persuaded
(and Not): Computer Animation in the Courtroom, 28 LAW & POL’Y 228 (2006) (describing an
experimental study of the effects of computer-animated displays on mock jurors); Saul M.
Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury: Facilitative and
Prejudicial Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1997) (same).
148. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784−816 (2001) (reporting the results of experiments
showing that federal magistrate judges are somewhat less susceptible to some cognitive
illusions than lay people, yet their judgment is affected by cognitive illusions producing
systematic errors).
149. Cf. Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation,
59 VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2222 (2006) (suggesting that insurers might have developed cognitive
skills that enable them to avoid many common errors during the litigation process).
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arguments aimed to counteract it. Further research involving debiasing techniques
and research with professional judges would enhance our understanding of judicial
behavior and the need and prospects for regulation in this context.
Finally, additional research should focus on the precise psychological
mechanisms underlying the anti-inference bias. For example, even if neither the
objective probability that a certain event occurred, nor the subjective assessment of
that probability, differ between direct-evidence and the inference conditions,
perhaps subjects’ confidence in their subjective assessment differs between the two
conditions. To be sure, a positive correlation between subjects’ confidence in their
probability assessment and their reluctance to impose liability based on
circumstantial evidence would not ipso facto justify the anti-inference bias. It may,
however, open up interesting possibilities regarding the relationship between this
bias and other phenomena such as ambiguity aversion.150 It may also shed light on
the normative argument made in the context of naked statistical evidence, namely
that fact finders should take into account not only the probability that a certain
event happened, but also the weight or resiliency of the evidence supporting this
probability.151 Perhaps one’s confidence in one’s probability assessment is
correlated with the “weight” of the available evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The experiments described in this study demonstrate that the disinclination of
fact finders to convict defendants or impose civil liability based solely on
circumstantial evidence is more powerful than previously realized. It characterizes
not only statistical, probabilistic, inconclusive, forensic, and non-case-specific
evidence, but also non-statistical, non-probabilistic, conclusive, eyewitness, and
case-specific evidence. None of the theories proposed as explanations for this
phenomenon provide a satisfactory account, indicating the presence of a robust,
deep-rooted anti-inference bias. This tendency can explain some features of extant
procedural and substantive rules, and it calls for careful consideration of possible
legal reforms.
Sherlock Holmes famously says that “when you have eliminated all which is
impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”152 Our
findings indicate, however, that most people—including judicial fact finders—
adopt the maxim used as the title for one of Carter Dixon’s Sir Henry Merrivale
mysteries, “Seeing is Believing.”153

150. While risky events have a certain probability for a given outcome, in ambiguous events
even the probability of a given outcome is unknown. Ambiguity aversion is usually
demonstrated through the Ellsberg paradox: people prefer to bet on an urn with fifty red and
fifty blue balls, rather than on an urn with 100 balls where the number of blue and red balls is
unknown. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643,
650−53 (1961). Possibly, a lower confidence in one’s probability assessment makes one more
reluctant to act on the basis of her assessment, as in ambiguity aversion.
151. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
152. Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Blanched Soldier, in THE CASE-BOOK OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES 33, 54 (House of Stratus 2001) (1927).
153. CARTER DICKSON, SEEING IS BELIEVING (1941).

